PROVISIONS RESPECTING SHORT SALES AND FAILED TRADES

Summary

Securities regulators in Canada and abroad have recently taken regulatory action to protect investors and market integrity in light of the current and unprecedented market turmoil. To address concerns of investors and marketplace participants, the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (“IIROC”) has responded by increasing its regular monitoring of trading on equity marketplaces in Canada, including heightened surveillance of all short selling activity and rates of trade failure.

IIROC has received approval to put in place various provisions which will provide IIROC with additional tools to address potential abusive short selling and failed trade activity. These provisions had previously been published for public comment in September of 2007. A proposal to remove all price restrictions at which a short sale may be made has been deferred at this time because of the current market conditions and the fact that the regulatory framework governing short selling is under active review in the United States and other foreign jurisdictions. IIROC will continue to monitor

developments in the Canadian market and new initiatives taken by foreign regulators with respect to short sales and failed trades and determine what additional actions should be taken.

In particular, the Board of Directors of IIROC approved for publication a request for comments on a proposal to preclude additional short sales by a person who has executed a failed trade unless arrangements have been made for the borrowing of the securities necessary to settle any resulting trade prior to the entry of the order (“Pre-Borrow Requirement”). This proposal is similar to the “hard T+3 close-out requirement” recently introduced in the United States. IIROC expects to publish the Rules Notice dealing with this proposal in the next few weeks. Persons will be given a 60-day period from the date the Rules Notice is published to comment on the proposal.

Notice of Approval
This Rules Notice provides notice of the approval by the applicable securities regulatory authorities (the “Recognizing Regulators”), effective October 14, 2008, of amendments to the Universal Market Integrity Rules (“UMIR”) respecting various aspects of short sales and failed trades (the “Amendments”). In particular, the Amendments:

• require that notice be provided to a Market Regulator if, after the execution of a trade, the trade is varied (with respect to price, volume or settlement date) or cancelled;

• provide that the Market Regulator may designate particular securities or class of securities as being ineligible for short selling;

• provide a definition of a “failed trade” and require that a report of a “failed trade” be made to a Market Regulator if the reason for the failure is not resolved within ten trading days following the original settlement date of the trade; and

• clarify certain requirements that must be met for a seller to be considered the owner of securities at the time of a sale.

Certain of the Amendments, while approved by the applicable securities regulatory authorities, will become effective on a future date. See “Implementation Plan” on pages 17 and 18.

The Amendments have been revised from the proposals contained in Market Integrity Notice 2007-017 – Request for Comments – Provisions Respecting Short Sales and Failed Trades (September 7, 2007) (the “Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal”). The provisions in the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal to:

• repeal the restrictions on the price at which a short sale may be made; and

• eliminate the requirement to file “Short Position Reports”

have been deferred at this time and are not part of the Amendments.

2 Securities and Exchange Commission, Release No. 34-58572 (September 17, 2008) dealing with Rule 240T under Regulation SHO.
Background to the Amendments

Statistical Study of Failed Trades on Canadian Marketplaces

The Amendments build on a study of failed trades undertaken by Market Regulation Services Inc. (“RS”) in 2006 (the “RS Failed Trade Study”). The RS Failed Trade Study found that:

- failed trades accounted for 0.27% of the total number of trades executed;
- the more “junior” the marketplace in terms of the type of security traded, the higher the incidence of failed trades;
- special settlement trades experienced a significantly higher rate of failure (6.15% of trades compared to 0.26% for regular settlement trades);
- the predominant cause of failed trades was administrative delay or error, which accounted for almost 51% of fails;
- less than 6% of fails resulting from the sale of a security involved short sales;
- fails involving short sales accounted for only 0.07% of total short sales;
- “buy-ins” were executed in only 4% of failed trades; and
- the average “failed” trade was settled 4.2 days after the “expected settlement date” with fully 96% of failed trades settled within 10 days after the “expected” settlement date.

The RS Failed Trade Study was conducted in early August of 2006 and, during that time, approximately 24% of sales made by dealers participating in the study were short sales. However, the RS Failed Trade Study found that only 6% of fails resulting from the sale of a security involved a short sale. This finding is at odds with the presumption underpinning the “fails list” provisions in the United States which further restricts short sales when a security passes the threshold on “fails” and is added to the fails list. Based on the results of the RS Failed Trade Study, the Amendments will require a Participant to file a report with IIROC if the failed trade is not resolved within 10 days following the settlement date, and that a further report be submitted once the problem has been rectified. In this way, the specific trades which are problematic will be brought to the attention of the regulator for further review and action if appropriate. IIROC expects that one outcome of this aspect of the Amendments will be enhancements in the policies and procedures of Participants to minimize the number of trades that will be subject to these reporting requirements (the by-product of which would be a reduction in the average number of days that a failed trade remains “outstanding”).


4 Rates of trade failure for Study Participants ranged from 0.22% of total trades by Study Participants on the TSX (a total of 838 fails out of 379,211 trades), to 0.90% of trades on TSXV (resulting from 239 fails out of 26,509 trades) and 2.22% of trades on CNQ (resulting from 1 failed trade out of the 45 trades executed on CNQ by Study Participants during the Study Period). The rate of trade failure on CNQ is comparable to the 2.21% rate reported by the SEC Office of Economic Analysis for US Exchange and OTC Bulletin Board securities based on data for May of 2006.

5 Administrative delays/errors generally include: inadvertent delays related to obtaining physical certificates for securities, custodian lacking instructions and discrepancies related to security price/amount.
**Recent Trends in Trading Activity, Short Selling and Failed Trades**

Concurrent with the issuance of the Rules Notice requesting comments on the Pre-Borrow Requirement, IIROC will be issuing an Administrative Notice setting out the results of a statistical report on trends on Canadian marketplaces in the period May 1, 2007 to September 30, 2008 (the “Study Period”) with respect to overall trading activity, short selling and failed trades.

Based on the information derived during the Study Period:

**Trading Activity**

- the number of trades in securities listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange ("TSX") has been increasing throughout the Study Period across all marketplaces trading those securities with the increase concentrated in trading of:
  - securities inter-listed between the TSX and an exchange in the United States ("inter-listed securities"), and
  - Exchange-traded Funds ("ETFs");
- while the number of trades in securities listed on the TSX Venture Exchange ("TSXV") or Canadian Trading and Quotation System Inc. ("CNQ") has varied significantly throughout the Study Period, the overall trend appears to be a reduction in the total number of trades per trading day;
- in periods of increased “market stress”:
  - trading activity as measured by number of trades, value traded and volume traded exceeds the average for the Study Period,
  - there is generally a lower than average level of short selling activity on the TSXV and CNQ,
  - there is a higher number of trades per alert generated on the TSX, and
  - the average number of statistical alerts generated per trading day decreases in relation to increases in the level of trading;
- over the Study Period, the average volume of a trade:
  - in an inter-listed security generally declined on the TSX,
  - on a new marketplace increased from levels at the time of launch,
  - in securities listed on TSXV and CNQ increased slightly;

**Short Sales**

- the more “senior” the security the higher the proportion of short sales;
- short sales tend to have a lower volume but higher value than sales from a “long position” (indicating a concentration of short sale activity in more senior and liquid securities on each of the marketplaces);
- short selling activity accounts for a disproportionate level of the trading activity on 3 of the 4 “new” marketplaces (possibly indicating a concentration of arbitrage and algorithmic trading);
• less than two-thirds of the short sales that qualify as “short exempt” are in fact marked in this manner (though the proportion of short sales that are marked as “exempt” has been increasing since the grant of the exemption from price restrictions in July of 2007);

• there has been an increase in the proportion of short sales involving inter-listed securities since the grant of the exemption from price restrictions in July of 2007;

• other than the increase in short sales of inter-listed securities, there has been no significant change over the Study Period in the pattern of short selling in comparison with the trading of securities generally;

Failed Trades

• over the Study Period:
  ○ the number of failed trades as a percentage of the overall number of trades has generally been declining,
  ○ on average, 4.95% of failed trades are closed out through the execution of a “buy-in” on a marketplace, and
  ○ the accumulated value of failed trades as a percentage of the value of trades has generally been declining; and

• “market stress” does not appear to have an impact on the rate or value of trade failures.

This report compares the recent Canadian experience with short sales and failed trades with the situation in the United States. In particular, the analysis undertaken by IIROC does not support the need in Canada for a number of the actions recently taken by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in the United States, including proposed amendments to Regulation SHO.

It is the intention of IIROC to update the results of the statistical report on a periodic basis. The update will be provided to the Recognizing Regulators and will be made publicly available through the issuance of an IIROC Notice.

Deferral of Aspects of the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal

Deferral of Proposal to Repeal of Price Restrictions on All Short Sales

Under the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal, one of the proposals was the repeal of all restrictions on the price at which a short sale may be made. This aspect of the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal would parallel action taken by the SEC in 2007 to repeal price restrictions on short sales in the United States.⁶

However, in light of recent actions taken by the SEC on a temporary basis to restrict or prohibit short sales on securities of financial issuers or issuers generally and given the concern expressed in the media that the repeal of price restrictions on short sales in the United States may have contributed to the

⁶ On June 13, 2007, the SEC approved amendments to remove the price restrictions on short sales as set out in Rule 10a-1 as well as any short sale price test of any self-regulatory organization. In addition, the amendments prohibit any self-regulatory organization from having a price test. These amendments were effective July 3, 2007 with a compliance date indicated of July 6, 2007.
volatility experienced in US markets, IIROC determined to defer at this time consideration of the repeal of price restrictions. Any proposal to consider the ratification or withdrawal of that portion of the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal dealing with the repeal of the price restrictions on short sales would be made if:

- the SEC indicates that it intends to propose the reintroduction of price restrictions or other similar restrictions or prohibitions on short sales in the United States;
- statistical data becomes available on the impact of the repeal of price restrictions on inter-listed securities that became effective in July of 2007; or
- the launch of a marketplace or a facility of a marketplace that does not system-enforce the price restrictions or the listing exchange ceases to be the “principal” market would introduce problems for Participants and Access Persons to comply with the existing UMIR provisions.

Deferral of Proposal to Repeal the Requirement for Short Position Reports

IIROC has decided to defer further consideration of that aspect of the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal that would have repealed the requirement for Participants and Access Persons to prepare and file a short position report on a semi-monthly basis. To replace the aggregation of the information in the short position reports filed by Participants and Access Persons into the Consolidated Short Position Report (“CSPR”), IIROC envisaged the dissemination by third parties of periodic summary reports of short sales effected on marketplaces in particular securities. IIROC will pursue the introduction of the trade summaries on the most cost effective and efficient basis (after consultation with the applicable securities regulatory authorities and marketplaces). At this time, IIROC believes that the options for the preparation of a consolidated summary report would be by:

- marketplaces acting co-operatively (in a manner similar to the preparation of the CSPR today);
- IIROC using the regulatory feed provided for trades on all regulated marketplaces; or
- the information processor, if one is approved for all regulated marketplaces.

IIROC would propose to pursue the repeal of Rule 10.10 only once IIROC is satisfied that adequate information on short sales executed on a marketplace has become generally available and there has been a period of at least six months to a year following the introduction of the summary reports on short sales executed on marketplaces during which both the summaries and the CSPR would be available. The availability of both types of reports will allow the current users of the CSPR an opportunity to evaluate the information provided by trading summaries and would provide IIROC an opportunity to track the relationship between information provided in the CSPR with the marketplace trading summaries.

Exemption from Price Restrictions on Short Sales for Inter-listed Securities

In light of the decision of the SEC to remove price restrictions on short sales, IIROC granted, effective July 6, 2007, an exemption from the price restrictions on a short sale under Rule 3.1 of UMIR in respect
of securities which are inter-listed on an exchange in the United States (the “Inter-listed Exemption”).

Under the Inter-listed Exemption, if a security is listed on an Exchange and is also listed on an exchange in the United States, a short sale of the security may be entered on any marketplace using the “short exempt” marker. Securities which trade on an ECN in the United States but are not otherwise listed on an exchange in the United States do not qualify for the exemption. With the decision to defer final consideration of that aspect of the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal dealing with the repeal of price restrictions on short sales of all securities, the Inter-listed Exemption will continue in force until the approval by the Recognizing Regulators or the withdrawal by IIROC from consideration of this aspect of the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal.

Other Monitoring Initiatives

To assist in the monitoring of short sales, IIROC will introduce additional alerts to its trade monitoring systems that will detect changes in the historic pattern of short selling for a particular security. To ensure an accurate audit trail, IIROC has introduced effective August 1, 2008 new automated procedures for correcting order markers including “bundled” orders which contain sales from both a long and a short position which have been marked as “short” or “short exempt”. Historically, “bundled” orders were to have been entered on a market with the most restrictive of the order markers applicable to any order in the bundle. (Reference should be made to IIROC Notice 08-0033 – Rules Notice – Guidance Note – New Procedures for Order Marker Corrections and IIROC Notice 08-0050 – Rules Notice – Guidance Note – User Guide for the Regulatory Marker Correction Form.)

Impact Study

With the approval of the Amendments, IIROC will undertake an empirical study (“Impact Study”) of:

- the impact of the Amendments;
- the effects of granting the Inter-listed Exemption; and
- the possible effects of a full repeal of all price restrictions on short sales.

It is the intention of IIROC to engage third party consultants to undertake the Impact Study. The construction and methodology of the Impact Study will be based on the recommendations of the consultants. The results of the Impact Study will be published by IIROC through the issuance of one or more IIROC Notices and the public will be provided with an opportunity to comment on the results of the Impact Study.

IIROC anticipates that the Impact Study would:

- analyze trading and settlement activity of listed securities (including both liquid and illiquid securities listed on TSX, TSXV and CNQ);
- cover a period of at least one year prior to and one year following the approval date of the Amendments; and

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7 For a more detailed description of the exemption, reference should be made to Market Integrity Notice 2007-014 - Guidance – Exemption of Certain Inter-listed Securities from Price Restrictions on Short Sales (July 6, 2007).
be based on five or more categories of listed securities being:

- securities inter-listed with an exchange in the United States,
- securities which qualify as “highly-liquid”, and
- at least three tiers of “illiquid” securities determined by relative liquidity.

The Impact Study will attempt to determine whether the Amendments or the Inter-listed Exemption had an effect on:

- volume of short selling;
- rates of trade failure;
- the relationship, or the lack thereof, between levels of short selling and trade failure;
- the ability to detect manipulative or deceptive trading in circumstances when abusive short selling has occurred;
- price volatility and the operation of the price discovery mechanism; and
- levels of displayed liquidity.

The Impact Study will also attempt to determine whether there was any difference in the effects based on the presence of “market stress” for the particular security or securities generally. In this context, “stress” would be measured by unusual volumes or price movement.

While the “Pilot Project” undertaken in the United States on behalf of the SEC in connection with the removal of price restrictions on short sales had found no evidence that the results of the Pilot Project would not be applicable to smaller or less liquid securities, the Impact Study would attempt to confirm whether this finding was applicable in the Canadian context. If the Impact Study found that the effect of the approved amendments varied significantly due to the liquidity of the issuers or if the Impact Study found deterioration in the rate of trade settlement, IIROC would then consider whether other additional amendments should be made to UMIR to incorporate comparable provisions from Regulation SHO (such as locate requirements, fail lists and close-out requirements.) IIROC may also consider whether price restrictions on short sales should be re-introduced for certain types of illiquid securities.

In the view of IIROC, there is no one measure from the Impact Study that would be determinative on the question of whether price restrictions should be reinstated with respect to the securities subject to the Inter-listed Exemption or repealed with respect to securities currently subject to price restrictions on a short sale. Rather, reinstatement should be considered if one or more of the following trends emerged (either generally or in connection with trading of a particular marketplace or type of security):

- an increase in the proportion of “failed trade reports” in relation to overall trading activity combined with an increase in the proportion of “short sale” transactions covered by the “failed trade reports”;
... • a significant increase in the failure rates of trade on regular settlement date (for which no explanation other than short sale failure is readily apparent);
• an increasing number of securities being designated as a “Short Sale Ineligible Security”;
• a disproportionate increase in the number of trading alerts generated by IIROC’s monitoring systems involving short sales; and
• a disproportionate increase in the number of cases subject to review or investigation by IIROC involving short sales.

The Impact Study will also provide an opportunity to track the relationship between information provided from the CSPR with that provided in the periodic trading summaries of short selling activity on marketplaces. If the Impact Study concludes that the trading summaries are an appropriate replacement for the CSPR, IIROC would pursue an amendment to UMIR through the publication of a Rules Notice requesting comment on the repeal of Rule 10.10. (See “Deferral of the Proposal to Repeal the Requirement for Short Position Reports” on page 6.)

Staff of IIROC considered a proposal for a “pilot project” (which would have provided an exemption from the price restrictions on a short sale for a range of securities including both highly-liquid and “illiquid” securities prior to repealing the price restrictions for all securities) as an alternative to the Impact Study. The TSXV currently does not support the “short exempt” marker. While the TSXV has indicated an intention to introduce the “short exempt” marker, the TSXV has not publicly announced a timetable for its introduction. The introduction of a pilot project would either have to be delayed until the TSXV had implemented the “short exempt” marker or would have necessitated significant programming changes by TSXV and possibly Participants accessing that marketplace in order to enable the price restrictions to be suspended for a subset of TSXV securities. As such, in the opinion of IIROC staff, a pilot project could not be implemented in a cost efficient and timely manner (as compared to the repeal of price restrictions on short sales of all securities accompanied by an impact study).

**CSA/SRO Working Group on Short Selling and Failed Trade Issues**

IIROC staff are participating (and prior to June 1, 2008 staff of both RS and the Investment Dealers Association of Canada (“IDA”) participated) in an informal working group comprised of staff from the Canadian Securities Administrators (“CSA”), Canadian Depository for Securities Limited (“CDS”), Toronto Stock Exchange and the Bourse de Montréal (the “Working Group”) that has been examining various issues related to failed trades and short sales, including the role that short sales play in the occurrence of failed trades. The Working Group is monitoring developments in the US, including proposals by the SEC to amend Regulation SHO.

The Working Group will be provided with the periodic updates published by IIROC to the *Recent Trends in Trading Activity, Short Selling and Failed Trades*. The Working Group will also be provided with any interim analysis prepared as part of the Impact Study. If settlement rates deteriorate after the implementation of the Amendments, either generally or for specific classes of securities, then IIROC would support additional initiatives by the marketplaces, CDS, CSA or the Member Regulation Policy...
Department of IIROC. Similarly, if significant “problems” emerged during this period with respect to the execution or settlement of short sales, IIROC and the other members of the Working Group would be in a position to consider appropriate additional regulatory responses.

Summary of the Amendments

The following is a summary of the principal components of the Amendments:

Additional Restrictions on Short Sales

Definition of “Short Sale Ineligible Security”

The Amendments allow the Market Regulator to designate a particular security or a class of securities as being ineligible to be sold “short”. The purpose of this provision is to provide additional flexibility to the Market Regulator to respond to developments in trading of a particular security or class of securities if rates of failed trades become, in the opinion of the Market Regulator, excessive. The Amendments also provide an exemption to permit a short sale of a “Short Sale Ineligible Security” if the sale is undertaken in furtherance of Market Maker Obligations or by a derivatives market maker.

The criteria which IIROC would use in pursuing a designation of a security have been specifically set out in Part 4 of Policy 1.1. If, based on reports of failed trades submitted to IIROC in accordance with the requirements of Rule 7.10 or other sources of information, IIROC became aware of systemic failures to settle trades in a particular security or class of securities that were related to short selling activity, the Amendments would permit IIROC to designate the particular security or class of securities as being ineligible for a short sale in the interest of a fair and orderly market. Since the RS Failed Trade Study indicated that short selling was not the primary reason for the existence of failed trades, IIROC is of the view that a statistical threshold would not by itself be appropriate and IIROC must determine that short selling is exacerbating the situation before determining to seek to designate the security as being ineligible for further short selling. IIROC is of the view that there are greater risks to market integrity if a series of dealers experience prolonged trade failures for relatively minor number of shares of security that is illiquid than from the failure of a single block trade (due possibly to administrative problems or delays at a custodian) in a highly-liquid security.

In the view of IIROC, the need to make a designation will be a relatively rare occurrence. Since the introduction of UMIR, there has been no instance when either RS or IIROC would have sought approval for such a designation. However, IIROC acknowledges that the repeal of price restrictions on short sales will likely result in increased volatility for less liquid securities. In addition, IIROC acknowledges that junior issuers are concerned with the possibility of “bear raids”. IIROC is of the view that the activity which is part of a “bear raid” will be detected in accordance with existing monitoring standards employed by IIROC and that such activity may be contrary to existing

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4 At the time of the drafting of UMIR, CDNX had Rule C.2.12 which provided: “The Exchange may, whenever it shall determine that market conditions so warrant, prescribe a prohibition on short selling”. A comparable provision was not incorporated into UMIR on the grounds that the general provisions curtailing abusive short selling made the provision unnecessary.
prohibitions on manipulative and deceptive behaviour. The concept of a “Short Sale Ineligible Security” is a “backstop” in the event that the repeal of price restrictions on short sales had an “unintended” impact on short selling activity or if short sales were found to be a principal reason for inordinate “failures” in the settlement of trades in a particular security.

IIROC does not believe that a designation will have to be made in “real time”. The circumstances which will lead to the need to designate a security will build over a period time (e.g. for a particular security, IIROC may see an increasing number of Failed Trade Reports, issuance of “buy-in” notices by CDS, an increasing proportion of short sales, unusual price or volume movements etc.) No one factor would necessarily lead to IIROC determining to seek a designation. Also, it is not possible to provide quantitative “thresholds” for each of the factors that would be taken into account by IIROC. IIROC would consider the circumstances of the particular issuer (e.g. whether the issuer has outstanding securities in respect of which conversion or other rights are tied to the market price of the security or whether the issuer has announced an intention to undertake a significant public offering, private placement or rights offering).

IIROC will only designate a security as a “Short Sale Ineligible Security” with the concurrence of the applicable securities regulatory authorities. IIROC will seek that concurrence in a designation from:

- each securities regulatory authority governing the conduct of trading of a marketplace on which the security is listed or quoted;
- each securities regulatory authority of a jurisdiction in which the issuer of the listed or quoted security is a reporting issuer; and
- each securities regulatory authority that has given notice to IIROC that it wishes to be consulted on a designation.

While IIROC does not believe that a designation will have to be made in “real time”, IIROC nonetheless believes that any designation will have to be “timely” in order to address situations arising in the marketplace. If IIROC detects “unusual circumstances” and that a “problem” was developing, IIROC would generally intend to issue an IIROC Notice providing market participants with notice that, with respect to the particular security, they should ensure their ability to borrow or obtain securities for settlement in advance of any sale. This notice by IIROC would provide an “early warning” to those

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Policy 2.2 of UMIR regarding False or Misleading Appearance of Trading Activity or Artificial Price provides that “entering an order for the sale of a security without, at the time of entering the order, having the reasonable expectation of settling any trade that would result from the execution of the order” would constitute a manipulative and deceptive activity. The provision does not require that the dealer make a “positive affirmation” that it has the ability to settle the trade but merely have a “reasonable expectation” at the time of the entry of the order. Essentially, a Participant may enter a short sale of a security until such time as the Participant knows, or should reasonably have known, that it can no longer borrow the securities to effect settlement. Among the activities precluded by Policy 2.2 is the so-called “death spiral” situations. Historically, a “death spiral” had occurred when an issuer was undergoing certain types of arrangements or capital reorganizations (including voluntary or involuntary conversion of debt to a class of listed equity) that tied the conversion or reorganization ratios to the market price of the security to be issued. As the market price of the listed security fell the number of securities to be issued rose. In anticipation of receiving additional listed securities on the completion of the transaction, investors would sell the additional listed security short into the market resulting in further downward pressure on the market price of the listed security. Since the securities that would be issuable on the arrangement or reorganization would not be available to settle the sales in the ordinary course, the sales would be considered “short sales” for the purposes of UMIR.
securities regulatory authorities that would be asked to concur in the designation of any security as being a “Short Sale Ineligible Security”. IIROC would continue to monitor trading in the particular security to determine if further action was warranted.

Under the Amendments, a short sale of a security that is designated as a “Short Sale Ineligible Security” may not be made. The Amendments contain a number of exemptions from this prohibition including if the order is entered on a marketplace:

- in furtherance of the applicable Market Maker Obligations in accordance with the Marketplace Rules of that marketplace;
- for the account of a derivatives market maker and is entered:
  - in accordance with the market making obligations of the seller in connection with the security or a related security, and
  - to hedge a pre-existing position in the security or a related security;
- as part of a Program Trade in accordance with Marketplace Rules;
- to satisfy an obligation to fill an order imposed on a Participant or Access Person by any provision of UMIR or a Policy; or
- that is of a class of security or type of transaction that has been designated by a Market Regulator.

**Exercise of Options, Rights and Warrants**

Under the definition of “short sale” in Rule 1.1 of UMIR, a seller shall be considered to own a security under various circumstances including if the seller, directly or through an agent or trustee:

- has purchased or has entered into an unconditional contract to purchase the security, but has not yet received delivery of the security;
- owns another security that is convertible or exchangeable into that security and has tendered such other security for conversion or exchange or has issued irrevocable instructions to convert or exchange such other security;
- has an option to purchase the security and has exercised the option; or
- has a right or warrant to subscribe for the security and has exercised the right or warrant.

The Amendments clarify the circumstances when a seller will be considered to have “converted”, “exchanged” or “exercised” securities for the purposes of the definition. Under the Amendments, the seller must have taken all steps necessary to become legally entitled to the security, including having:

- made any payment required;
- submitted to the appropriate person any required forms or notices; and
• submitted, if applicable, to the appropriate person any certificates for securities to be converted, exchanged or exercised.

If the seller has not taken all necessary steps to become legally entitled to the security, the seller will be considered to be making a short sale.

**Variation and Cancellation of Trades After Execution**

The Amendments introduce a requirement that a trade cannot be cancelled or varied (with respect to: the price of the trade; the volume of the trade; or the date for settlement of the trade) except if the cancellation or variation was made by:

- IIROC in accordance with UMIR; or
- with notice to IIROC immediately following the variation or cancellation of the trade in such form and manner as may be required by IIROC.

Prior to the settlement of the trade, each Participant or Access Person who is a party to a trade may not agree to a cancellation or variation of the trade (with respect to: the price of the trade; the volume of the trade; or the date for settlement of the trade) except through the procedures and facilities offered by the marketplace on which the trade was executed or the clearing agency through which the trade is or was to be cleared and settled. The use of the procedures and facilities provided by the marketplace or the clearing agency will ensure that information regarding the cancellation or variation can be disseminated to the appropriate information vendors.

The addition of the notice requirement should not impose, in the ordinary course, a greater administrative burden upon a Participant or Access Person. The current practice for a Participant or Access Person is to contact CDS to add, vary or cancel trades prior to settlement. CDS reports these variations or cancellations to the marketplace for review and, in turn, the marketplace forwards the report to IIROC. If IIROC concludes that there are no market integrity concerns and agrees with the change, the marketplace amends the official record of the trade. However, if the trade cancellation or variation is made after the settlement of the trade by the clearing agency, notice of the trade cancellation or variation shall be provided to IIROC by each Participant and Access Person that is a party to the trade.

The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that a trade variation or cancellation is not effected outside the normal processes of the marketplaces and CDS unless IIROC is notified of the variation or cancellation and has the opportunity to review the change for possible market integrity concerns. Notice of a trade cancellation or variation will allow IIROC or another regulation services provider to ensure that the cancellation or variation of the trade is for a bona fide reason and not as part of a manipulative or deceptive manner of trading (including the establishment of a price that would permit other trading activity to then be conducted in nominal compliance with UMIR or other securities regulatory requirements).
Handling of Failed Trades

Report of an Extended “Failed Trade”

Securities regulators generally have a concern regarding the relationship between failed trades and preserving market integrity. In order to ensure that the audit trail for any trade is accurate and that IIROC has sufficient information to evaluate whether trading activity has been conducted in compliance with UMIR and other regulatory requirements, the Amendments introduce a requirement that each Participant or Access Person is required to report to IIROC if a trade that has failed to settle on the settlement date remains unresolved 10 trading days following the settlement date. These reports will allow IIROC to determine if the trade has failed to settle for an “improper” reason (for example, if a sale had been executed as an undeclared short sale).

Once an initial report of a “failed trade” had been filed with IIROC, the Participant or Access Person will be required to file a second report once the account has cured the default. In this way, IIROC will be in a position to monitor trends in “failed trades” including the steps which a Participant or Access Person may be taking to rectify the default. Information from the reports will be used by IIROC in making a determination whether a particular security should be designated as a “Short Sale Ineligible Security”. (See “Definition of “Short Sale Ineligible Security” on pages 10 to 12.)

IIROC expects that both the initial report of a failed trade and the report of the closing out of the position will be filed electronically with IIROC in a standard form that permits IIROC to assemble the information in a database for analysis purposes. The Amendments provide that such reports are to be filed at such time as may be required by IIROC. At this time, IIROC expects that the initial report will be provided to IIROC on the eleventh trading day following the “failure” and that the “close-out” report will be provided to IIROC by the end of trading day following the cure of the default. (See “Implementation Plan” on pages 17 and 18.)

The initial failed trade will indicate the steps that have been taken to resolve the “failure” in the preceding 10 business days and which are proposed to be taken to resolve the failure. A “close-out” report is also required to be filed which will indicate the steps which were ultimately taken to resolve the failure. During the period between the initial report and the close-out report, IIROC would be in a position to inquire of a Participant or Access Person as to whether additional steps had been taken since the filing of the initial report. In making such requests, IIROC would rely on its general investigative power under Rule 10.2 of UMIR in the same manner as IIROC does in a review or investigation of other trading activity.

Definition of a “Failed Trade”

The Amendments define a “failed trade” as a trade resulting from the execution of an order entered by a Participant or Access Person on a marketplace on behalf of an account and,

- in the case of a sale other than a short sale, the account failed to make available securities in such number and form;
• in the case of a short sale, the account failed to make:
  o available securities in such number and form, or
  o arrangements with the Participant or Access Person to borrow securities in such number
    and form; and

• in the case of a purchase, the account failed to make available monies in such amount,

as to permit the settlement of the trade at the time on the date contemplated on the execution of the trade. The definition also confirms that a trade shall be considered a “failed trade” irrespective of whether the trade has been settled in accordance with the rules or requirements of the clearing agency. The definition measures the existence of a “failed trade” at the account level and the default of the account holder in meeting settlement obligations. For example, if a Participant “fails” to settle both the purchase and sale of a given amount of a particular security, the position of the Participant at the clearing agency may be “accurate” as a result of continuous net settlement but there remain two accounts which have defaulted on their settlement obligations. If this default persisted for a period of ten trading days beyond the normal settlement date, each of the accounts would be considered to have a “failed trade”.

Each Participant is already “monitoring” each trade failure. Presently, the “failure” is a credit issue as the account which made a sale has failed to deliver the securities or has delivered securities which are not in a “good delivery” form (e.g. the securities are subject to a legend which has not been removed) or failed to deliver cash in the case of a purchase. The Participant is obligated to settle any trade which it has executed and may be subject to “buy-in” procedures. If the Participant has settled the trade, the Participant must recover either the securities or the money from the account which made the trade. IIROC acknowledges that the current policies and procedures of most Participants do not necessarily provide for this information to come to the attention of the compliance department. The change which is introduced by the Amendments will only require this information to be made available to compliance for the purposes of making a report to IIROC in the event that the failure has persisted for a period of more than 10 days.

**Anti-Avoidance Provisions**

The trigger for the reporting obligation with respect to a failed trade is for the account to have been in default for a period of 10 trading days after the original settlement date of the trade. The Amendments make a consequential amendment to Policy 2.1 to confirm that entering into a transaction or series of transactions in an attempt to “re-age” the default such that a report of the original failed trade would not have to be filed would be considered a violation of the requirement to conduct trading openly and fairly.
Summary of the Impact of the Amendments

The following is a summary of the most significant impacts of the adoption of the Amendments:

- limits the ability to vary (with respect to price, volume or settlement date) or cancel a trade after execution unless notice has been provided to a Market Regulator;
- requires a report of a “failed trade” be made if the reason for the failure is not resolved within ten trading days following the original settlement date of the trade; and
- provides that the Market Regulator may designate particular securities or class of securities as being ineligible for short selling.

Certain of the Amendments, while approved by the applicable securities regulatory authorities, will become effective on a future date. See “Implementation Plan” on pages 17 and 18.

The provisions of the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal to:

- remove the restrictions on the price at which a short sale may be executed; and
- eliminate the requirement to file “Short Position Reports”

have been deferred and are not part of the Amendments.

Summary of Changes from the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal

The Amendments specifically vary aspects of the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposals, including:

(a) the deferral of the proposal to repeal the price restrictions on short sales;
(b) setting out the factors to be taken into account by the Market Regulator in determining whether to designate a particular security as being a “Short Sale Ineligible Security”;
(c) introducing an exemption from the requirement for the marking of short sales if the order has been automatically generated by the trading system of an Exchange or QTRS in accordance with the Marketplace Rules in respect of the applicable Market Maker Obligations;
(d) introducing an exemption to permit a short sale of a “Short Sale Ineligible Security” if the sale is undertaken in furtherance of Market Maker Obligations or by a derivatives market maker;
(e) deleting the proposed power of a Market Integrity Official to cancel certain failed trades if there was no reasonable prospect that the “failure” would be rectified;
(f) making editorial changes to the definition of “short sale” to further clarify when a seller will be considered to hold a security;
(g) making an editorial change to refer to “UMIR” rather than “the Rules” to reflect drafting changes made to UMIR consequential on the merger of RS and IDA; and
(h) the deferral of the proposal to repeal the requirement for Participants and Access Persons to prepare and file a “short position report”.

Implementation Plan

Reports of Extended “Failed Trades”

With the approval of Amendments related to a Participant or Access Person providing notice to IIROC of an extended “failed trade”, IIROC will implement a secure electronic method for a Participant or Access Person to provide such notice or report to IIROC. In order to provide Participants and Access Persons with an opportunity to make changes to their policies and procedures to accommodate the introduction of these notice and reporting obligations, implementation of the various provisions related to the provision of notice to IIROC of such extended failed trades is deferred until March 1, 2009.

On or before February 1, 2009, IIROC will issue an IIROC Notice setting out the content of the required reports and the procedures for filing such report electronically with IIROC. As presently contemplated, the report would include the identification of:

- the trade, including the security, volume and price;
- the marketplace including the time of execution and any identification number assigned by the marketplace to the trade;
- the dealers that were parties to the trade;
- the holder of the account that “failed” including the account name and number;
- the trader or investment adviser entering the order on behalf of the account;
- the type of order entered and any terms, conditions or consents attached to the handling of the order;
- the markers attached to the order, including whether the order was a short sale, jitney order, insider order or significant shareholder order;
- reason for the failure;
- the steps taken in the preceding 10 business days to resolve the failure; and
- the additional steps proposed to be taken to resolve the failure.

Reports of Trade Variations and Cancellation

With the approval of Amendments related to a Participant or Access Person providing notice to IIROC of a variation or cancellation of a trade subsequent to its execution, IIROC will implement a secure electronic method for a Participant or Access Person to provide such notice or report to IIROC. (Prior to the settlement of the trade, any notice of variation or cancellation would be provided to IIROC by the marketplace or clearing agency). In order to provide Participants and Access Persons with an
opportunity to make changes to their policies and procedures to accommodate the introduction of these notice and reporting obligations, implementation of the various provisions related to the provision of notice to IIROC of such trade variations and cancellation is deferred until March 1, 2009. On or before February 1, 2009, IIROC will issue an IIROC Notice setting out the content of the required reports and the procedures for filing such report electronically with IIROC.

Appendices

- Appendix “A” sets out the text of the Amendments to the Rules and Policies respecting short sales and failed trades; and
- Appendix “B” sets out a summary of the comment letters received in response to the Request for Comments on the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal set out in Market Integrity Notice 2007-017 - Request for Comments – Provisions Respecting Short Sales and Failed Trades (September 7, 2007). Appendix “B” also sets out the response of IIROC to the comments received and provides additional commentary on the revisions the Amendments made to the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal.
Appendix “A”

Provisions Respecting Short Sales and Failed Trades

The Universal Market Integrity Rules are hereby amended as follows:

1. Rule 1.1 is amended by:
   (a) adding the following definition of “failed trade”:

   “failed trade” means a trade resulting from the execution of an order entered by a Participant or Access Person on a marketplace on behalf of an account and

   (a) in the case of a sale, other than a short sale, the account failed to make available securities in such number and form;

   (b) in the case of a short sale, the account failed to make:

       (i) available securities in such number and form, or

       (ii) arrangements with the Participant or Access Person to borrow securities in such number and form; and

   (c) in the case of a purchase, the account failed to make available monies in such amount,

   as to permit the settlement of the trade at the time on the date contemplated on the execution of the trade provided a trade shall be considered a “failed trade” irrespective of whether the trade has been settled in accordance with the rules or requirements of the clearing agency.

   (b) varying the definition of “short sale” by:

       (i) inserting at the end of the opening the phrase “, directly or through an agent or trustee”,

       (ii) inserting at the beginning of clause (b) “owns another security that is convertible or exchangeable into that security and”,

       (iii) deleting clause (e) and substituting the following:

           (e) has entered into a contract to purchase a security that trades on a when issued basis and such contract is binding on both parties and subject only to the condition of issuance or distribution of the security,

   (c) adding the following definition of “Short Sale Ineligible Security”:

       “Short Sale Ineligible Security” means a security or a class of securities that has been designated by a Market Regulator to be a security in respect of which
an order that on execution would be a short sale may not be entered on a marketplace for a particular trading day or trading days.

2. Part 3 of UMIR is amended by adding the following as Rule 3.2:

### 3.2 Prohibition on Entry of Orders

(1) A Participant or Access Person shall not enter an order to sell a security on a marketplace that on execution would be a short sale:

(a) unless the order is marked as a short sale in accordance with subclause 6.2(1)(b)(viii) or subclause 6.2(1)(b)(ix); or

(b) if the security is a Short Sale Ineligible Security at the time of the entry of the order.

(2) Clause (a) of subsection (1) does not apply to an order automatically generated by the trading system of an Exchange or QTRS in accordance with the Marketplace Rules in respect of the applicable Market Maker Obligations.

(3) Clause (b) of subsection (1) does not apply to an order entered on a marketplace:

(a) in furtherance of the applicable Market Maker Obligations in accordance with the Marketplace Rules of that marketplace;

(b) for the account of a derivatives market maker and is entered:

(i) in accordance with the market making obligations of the seller in connection with the security or a related security, and

(ii) to hedge a pre-existing position in the security or a related security;

(c) as part of a Program Trade in accordance with Marketplace Rules;

(d) to satisfy an obligation to fill an order imposed on a Participant or Access Person by any provision of UMIR or a Policy; or

(e) that is of a class of security or type of transaction that has been designated by a Market Regulator.

3. Adding the following as Rule 7.10
7.10 Extended Failed Trades

(1) If within ten trading days following the date for settlement contemplated on the execution of a failed trade, the account:

(a) in the case of a sale, other than a short sale, that failed to make available securities in such number and form;

(b) in the case of a short sale, that failed to make:

(i) available securities in such number and form, or

(ii) arrangements with the Participant or Access Person to borrow securities in such number and form; and

(c) in the case of a purchase, that failed to make available monies in such amount,

as to permit the settlement of the trade at the time on the date contemplated on the execution of the trade has not made available such securities or monies or has not made arrangements for the borrowing of the securities, as the case may be, the Participant or Access Person that entered the order on a marketplace shall give notice to the Market Regulator at such time and in such form and manner and containing such information as may be required by the Market Regulator.

(2) If a Participant or Access Person is required to provide notice of a failed trade to the Market Regulator in accordance with subsection (1), the Participant or Access Person shall, upon the account making available the applicable securities or monies or making arrangement for the borrowing of the applicable securities, give notice to the Market Regulator at such time and in such form and manner and containing such information as may be required by the Market Regulator.

4. Adding the following as Rule 7.11

7.11 Variation and Cancellation of Trades

No trade executed on a marketplace shall, subsequent to the execution of the trade, be:

(a) cancelled; or

(b) varied with respect to:

(i) the price of the trade,

(ii) the volume of the trade, or

(iii) the date for settlement of the trade,
except:

(c) by the Market Regulator in accordance with UMIR; or

(d) with notice to the Market Regulator immediately following the variation or cancellation of the trade in such form and manner as may be required by the Market Regulator and such notice shall be given, if the variation or cancellation is made:

(i) prior to the settlement of the trade, by:

(A) the marketplace on which the trade was executed, or

(B) the clearing agency through which the trade is or was to be cleared and settled, and

(ii) after the settlement of the trade, by each Participant and Access Person that is a party to the trade.

The Policies to the Universal Market Integrity Rules are hereby amended as follows:

1. Policy 1.1 is amended by adding the following Parts:

   **Part 3 – Definition of “Short Sale”**

   Under the definition of “short sale”, a seller shall be considered to own a security under various circumstances including if the seller, directly or through an agent or trustee:

   - owns another security that is convertible or exchangeable into that security and has tendered such other security for conversion or exchange or has issued irrevocable instructions to convert or exchange such other security;

   - has an option to purchase the security and has exercised the option; or

   - has a right or warrant to subscribe for the security and has exercised the right or warrant.

   In each of these circumstances, the seller must have taken all steps necessary to become legally entitled to the security, including having:

   - made any payment required;

   - submitted to the appropriate person any required forms or notices; and

   - submitted, if applicable, to the appropriate person any certificates for securities to be converted, exchanged or exercised.
Part 4 – Definition of “Short Sale Ineligible Security”

Under the definition of a “short sale ineligible security”, the Market Regulator may designate a security or class of securities in respect of which an order that on execution would be a short sale may not be entered on a marketplace for a particular trading day or trading days. In determining whether to make such a designation, the Market Regulator shall consider whether:

- based on reports of failed trades submitted to the Market Regulator in accordance with Rule 7.10 or other information known to the Market Regulator, there is in a particular security or class of securities an unusual number or pattern of failed trades by more than one Participant or Access Person;
- the number or pattern of failed trades is related to short selling; and
- the designation would be in the interest of maintaining a fair and orderly market.

2. Part 1 of Policy 2.1 is amended by deleting the second paragraph and substituting the following:

Participants and Access Persons who intentionally organize their business and affairs with the intent or for the purpose of avoiding the application of a Requirement may be considered to have engaged in behaviour that is a failure to conduct business openly and fairly or in accordance with just and equitable principles of trade. For example, the Market Regulator considers that a person who is under an obligation to enter orders on a marketplace who “uses” another person to make a trade off of a marketplace (in circumstances where an “off-market exemption” is not available) to be violating the requirement to conduct business openly and fairly or in accordance with just and equitable principles of trade. Similarly, the Market Regulator considers that a person who enters into a transaction for the purpose of rectifying a failure in connection with a failed trade prior to the time that a report must be filed in accordance with Rule 7.10 and such person knows or ought reasonably to know that such transaction will result in a failed trade to be engaging in “re-aging” for the purpose of avoiding reporting obligations contrary to the requirement to conduct business openly and fairly or in accordance with just and equitable principles of trade.
Appendix “B”

Comments Received in Response to
Market Integrity Notice 2007-017 – Request for Comments - Provisions Respecting Short Sales and Failed Trades

On September 7, 2007, Market Integrity Notice 2007-017 – Request for Comments - Provisions Respecting Short Sales and Failed Trades was published requesting comments on proposed amendments to UMIR respecting various aspects of short sales and failed trades (“Short Sale and Failed Trades Proposal”). Comments were received on the Short Sale and Failed Trades Proposal from:

- Absolute Software Corporation (“Absolute”)
- Acuity Investment Management Inc. (“Acuity”)
- Alternative Investment Management Association (“AIMA”)
- BMO Nesbitt Burns (“BMO”)
- Canaccord Capital (“Canaccord”)
- Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (“CPPIB”)
- Canadian Security Traders Association, Inc. (“CSTA”)
- Canadian Trading and Quotation System Inc. (“CNQ”)
- Donald Coates (“Coates”)
- Connor, Clark, & Lunn Investment Management Ltd. (“CCLIM”)
- Globex Mining Enterprises Inc. (“Globex”)
- International Association of Small Broker-Dealers and Advisers (“IASBDA”)
- Investment Industry Association of Canada (“IIAC”)
- ITG Canada Corp. (“ITG”)
- Morgan Stanley Canada (“MS”)
- David Patch (“Patch”)
- Platinum Group Metals Ltd. (“Platinum”)
- RBC Dominion Securities (“RBC”)
- Sentry Select Capital Corp. (“Sentry”)
- Simon Romano (“Romano”)
- Swift Trade Inc. (“Swift”)
- TD Newcrest (“TD”)
- Trinidad Energy Services Income Trust (“Trinidad”)
- TSX Group Inc. (“TSX Group”)

Virgin Metals Inc. ("Virgin")

A copy of each comment letter submitted in response to the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal is publicly available on the IIROC website (www.iiroc.ca under the heading “Policy” and sub-heading “Market Proposals/Comments”). The following table presents a summary of the comments received on the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal together with the response of IIROC to those comments. Column 1 of the table highlights the revisions to the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal made by IIROC in response to these comments and the comments of the Recognizing Regulators.

### Text of Provisions Following Adoption of the Amendments (Changes from the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal Highlighted)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Text of Provisions Following Adoption of the Amendments (Changes from the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal Highlighted)</th>
<th>Commentator and Summary of Comment</th>
<th>IIROC Response to Comment and Additional IIROC Commentary</th>
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</table>
| **1.1 Definitions**

“failed trade” means a trade resulting from the execution of an order entered by a Participant or Access Person on a marketplace on behalf of an account and

(a) in the case of a sale, other than a short sale, the account failed to make available securities in such number and form;

(b) in the case of a short sale, the account failed to make:

(i) available securities in such number and form, or

(ii) arrangements with the Participant or Access Person to borrow securities in such number and form; and

(c) in the case of a purchase, the account failed to make available monies in such amount,

as to permit the settlement of the trade at the time on the date contemplated on the execution of the trade provided a trade shall be considered a “failed trade” irrespective of whether the trade has been settled in accordance with the rules or requirements of the clearing agency.

**BMO** – Does not fundamentally disagree with proposed definition of “failed trade” but has concerns regarding administrative burden of failed trade reporting.

See responses to comments on Rule 7.10.

| “short sale” means a sale of a security, other than a derivative instrument, which the seller does not own either directly or through an agent or trustee and, for this purpose, a seller shall be considered to own a security if the seller, directly or through an agent or trustee:

(a) has purchased or has entered into an unconditional contract to purchase the security, but has not yet received delivery of the security;

(b) owns directly or through an agent or trustee another security that is convertible or exchangeable into that security and has tendered such other security for conversion or exchange or has issued irrevocable instructions to convert or exchange such other security; | **Romano** – The “agent or trustee” qualification in paragraph (b) of the definition of “short sale” should also apply to (a), (c), (d) and (e). | IIROC has made the suggested change and in doing so has made certain consequential amendments to Part 3 of Policy 1.1 and to clause (e) of the definition to ensure consistent structure. |

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<td>(c) has an option to purchase the security and has exercised the option; (d) has a right or warrant to subscribe for the security and has exercised the right or warrant; or (e) is making a sale of a security that trades on a when-issued basis, and the seller has entered into a contract to purchase a security that trades on a when-issued basis, such security and such contract is binding on both parties and subject only to the condition of issuance of or distribution of the security, but a seller shall be considered not to own a security if: (f) the seller has borrowed the security to be delivered on the settlement of the trade and the seller is not otherwise considered to own the security in accordance with this definition; (g) the security held by the seller is subject to any restriction on sale imposed by applicable securities legislation or by an Exchange or QTRS as a condition of the listing or quoting of the security; or (h) the settlement date or issuance date pursuant to: (i) an unconditional contract to purchase, (ii) a tender of a security for conversion or exchange, (iii) an exercise of an option, or (iv) an exercise of a right or warrant would, in the ordinary course, be after the date for settlement of the sale.</td>
<td><strong>Absolute</strong> – Difficult to rationally implement due to the challenge of determining appropriate characteristics to qualify for inclusion on the list. IIROC believes that a subjective rather than an objective test is the most appropriate. IIROC intends to look at the “situation” of a particular security in relation to its historic “record” of trading activity.</td>
<td>The criteria which IIROC would use in pursuing a designation of a security were set out in the Market Integrity Notice containing the Proposed Amendments. The Amendments vary the Proposed Amendments and incorporate these criteria as Part 4 of Policy 1.1. If, based on reports of failed trades submitted to IIROC in accordance with the Rule 7.10 or other sources of validity.</td>
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“Short Sale Ineligible Security” means a security or class of securities that has been designated by a Market Regulator to be a security in respect of which an order that on execution would be a short sale may not be entered on a marketplace for a particular trading day or trading days. | **BMO** – Generally, supports ability to designate, but would like further clarification as to threshold of failed trades or other factors used to determine designation and queries whether such factors will be published. | 

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<td><strong>IIROC</strong></td>
<td>Information, IIROC became aware of systemic failures to settle trades in a particular security or class of securities that were related to short selling activity, the Amendments permit IIROC to designate the particular security or class of securities as being ineligible for a short sale in the interest of a fair and orderly market. Since the study by IIROC of failed trades indicated that short selling was not the primary reason for the existence of failed trades, IIROC is of the view that a statistical threshold would not by itself be appropriate and IIROC must determine that short selling is exacerbating the situation before determining to seek to designate the security as being ineligible for further short selling.</td>
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<td><strong>Canaccord</strong> – Notes that removing a security or class of securities from the new pricing regime may entail a great deal of effort from multiple vendors, exchanges and ATSs to build an exception facility.</td>
<td>IIROC expects that the designation of a security as being a “Short Sale Ineligible Security” would be a relatively “rare” occurrence. Provision for system enforcement of the prohibition on short sales could be at the level of marketplaces, service providers and/or the Participants and Access Persons. If the restriction is not system enforced at one of these levels, IIROC would expect a Participant to employ its “special handling procedures” to route sell orders for the particular security to a trade desk.</td>
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<td><strong>CSTA</strong> – IIROC must further quantify reasons for designation as ineligible for short sale. Failed trades may not be the only consideration.</td>
<td>See response to BMO comment above.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IIAC</strong> – In the absence of specific criteria and guidelines, IIROC should allow an efficient market to dictate.</td>
<td>The test is the ability to maintain a fair and orderly market. IIROC does not believe that a uniform pre-determined threshold is appropriate for varying market conditions and types of securities. See response to BMO comment above.</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>ITG</strong> – An “ineligible” designation may have a negative impact as such trades provide needed liquidity. More appropriate for IIROC to use UMIR 2.2 to address integrity issues.</td>
<td>The application of the restrictions in Rule 2.2 on the ability to make a short sale is determined by the circumstances of the particular Participant or Access Person. The “Short Sale Ineligible” designation would apply when the failures to settle are becoming systemic such that a fair and orderly market for the particular security ceases to exist or there are other recognized risks to market integrity arising out of continued short selling of the security. IIROC questions whether a trade that has a significant likelihood of failing or that is a risk to market integrity has provided “needed liquidity”.</td>
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<td><strong>MS, TD and TSX</strong> – Supports IIROC ability to monitor, intervene and designate a security or class as ineligible to be sold short where market conditions warrant.</td>
<td>IIROC acknowledges support for the proposal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RBC</strong> – Clearly defined criteria are needed with clarification on how the list will be communicated. Asks: Can a dealer short if he can locate, even if security is on the list?</td>
<td>See response to BMO comment above. If IIROC designated a security, IIROC would intend to communicate that fact through the issuance of a Rules Notice. The purpose of the designation would be to preclude any short sale even if the seller can locate a source to lend the security.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Romano</strong> – Proposed definition should allow for IIROC to establish terms and conditions under which otherwise ineligible short sales would be permitted. Alternatively, current exemptions in UMIR 3.1(2) should be allowed in all cases.</td>
<td>IIROC has the ability to grant exemptions on a case by case basis pursuant to Rule 11.1. However, IIROC acknowledges that market makers (for both the equity and underlying derivatives) may need to complete short sales even in circumstances when the security is otherwise ineligible for a short sale. For this reason, the Amendments revised the Proposed Amendments and added subsections (2) and (3) to what will become Rule 3.2.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Trinidad</strong> – Requests criteria be set out publicly.</td>
<td>See response to BMO comment above.</td>
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**3.1 Restrictions on Short Selling**

(1) Except as otherwise provided, a Participant or Access Person shall not make a short sale of a security on a marketplace unless the price is at or above the last sale price.

Given the initiatives which are being undertaken or proposed by foreign securities regulators with respect to the conduct of short sales, IIROC has determined to defer consideration of the proposal to remove price restrictions on all short sales. The Impact Study will...
A short sale of a security may be made on a marketplace at a price below the last sale price if the sale is:

(a) a Program Trade in accordance with Marketplace Rules;

(b) made in furtherance of the applicable Market Maker Obligations in accordance with the Marketplace Rules;

(c) for an arbitrage account and the seller knows or has reasonable grounds to believe that an offer enabling the seller to cover the sale is then available and the seller intends to accept such offer immediately;

(d) for the account of a derivatives market maker and is made:
   (i) in accordance with the market making obligations of the seller in connection with the security or a related security, and
   (ii) to hedge a pre-existing position in the security or a related security;

(e) the first sale of the security on any marketplace made on an ex-dividend, ex-rights or ex-distribution basis and the price of the sale is not less than the last sale price reduced by the cash value of the dividend, right or other distribution;

(f) the result of:
   (i) a Call Market Order,
   (ii) a Market-on-Close Order
   (iii) a Volume-Weighted Average Price Order
   (iv) a Basis Order, or
   (v) a Closing Price Order;

(g) a trade in an Exchange-traded Fund; or

(h) made to satisfy an obligation to fill an order imposed on a Participant or Access Person by any provision of UMIR or a Policy.

**IIROC Response to Comment and Additional IIROC Commentary**

analyze the effect of the repeal of price restrictions on the trading of securities inter-listed between the TSX and other exchanges in the United States that became effective in July of 2007. Until additional information can be gathered on the effect of the price restrictions, Rule 3.1 will be retained and the provision in the Proposed Amendments that would have been Rule 3.1 will be renumbered as Rule 3.2.
### Text of Provisions Following Adoption of the Amendments (Changes from the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal Highlighted)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Prohibition on Entry of Orders</td>
<td><strong>Absolute, Globex and Platinum</strong> — The removal of the restrictions threatens investors in low-volume Canadian issuers and the issuers themselves with an increased likelihood of market manipulation. The volatility and downward price pressure associated with minimally restrained short selling can artificially reduce shareholders’ returns and negatively impact small cap issuers’ ability to access capital as share prices decouple from underlying fundamentals and react to amplified market pressures. The change could cause issuers and investors to lose confidence in the fairness of Canadian markets.</td>
<td>In the ordinary course, the objective of a short seller is no different than the seller of a security from a long position in that they want to maximize the proceeds of any sale. Persons who enter orders with the intention of effecting an “artificial” price (either through a purchase or sale or through the use of margin or a short sale) is engaging in manipulative behaviour which is proscribed by existing rules and detected by existing alerts in the monitoring systems of IIROC.</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Acuity and Sentry</strong> — Opposed to the outright repeal of price restrictions due to potential to increase volatility and create unnecessary concern on the part of retail investors.</td>
<td>As indicated in the Market Integrity Notice, a significant number of securities in the United States (including the Nasdaq Small Cap Market) were never subject to price restrictions on short sales and others were covered by the Pilot Project described in the notice. IIROC will undertake an “Impact Study” to determine if the repeal of price restrictions on inter-listed securities has any measurable effect on price volatility in the Canadian context (e.g. have the inter-listed securities had a pattern of volatility that is statistically significant from the pattern experienced by Canadian securities that remain subject to price restrictions on short sales). The Pilot Project in the US indicated that the repeal of price restrictions on short sales resulted in lower volatility for larger stocks but there were some evidence of increased volatility for smaller and less liquid securities.</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>AIMA, IIAC, ITG, Swift and TD</strong> — Supports the repeal of price restrictions.</td>
<td>IIROC acknowledges support for the proposal.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>BMO, CPPIB and CSTA</strong> — Supports the repeal of price restrictions. Elimination of price restrictions will have the effect of facilitating efficient price discovery and enhancing liquidity and best execution.</td>
<td>IIROC acknowledges support for the proposal.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Canaccord</strong> — Supports the repeal of price restrictions but acknowledges that less liquid stocks may prove more</td>
<td>The repeal of price restrictions on short sales would not effect existing “anti-manipulation” provisions</td>
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<td><strong>[Note: The text continues with additional commentary and IIROC responses.]</strong></td>
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<td>problematic (and IIROC should monitor to ensure no undue pressures).</td>
<td>CCLIM – Supports the repeal of price restrictions as such restrictions add to trading costs, reduce market efficiency and do not prevent manipulation. Existing restrictions inhibit efficient price discovery by requiring a “passive execution approach to short sales” thereby sacrificing “immediacy and execution certainty”. The tick test does not prevent manipulation and reliance should instead be put on Policy 2.2.</td>
<td>IIROC acknowledges support for the proposal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>under UMIR. As short sales will be marked, IIROC would, in the event of the repeal of all price restrictions on short sales, be able to continue to monitor the effect of short selling activity using existing alerts for the detection of possible manipulative behaviour. This is currently the case with respect to the monitoring of trading on inter-listed securities that are covered by the Inter-listed Exemption.</td>
<td>CNQ - Tick test is unnecessary as manipulation is prohibited under other provisions of UMIR.</td>
<td>See response to Canaccord above.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Patch – “Piggybacking” on the US analysis may be disastrous for the Canadian market. US markets have become volatile and unruly since the removal of the tick test. Eliminating tick test while allowing naked shorting is a recipe for disaster.</td>
<td>IIROC proposes to test the effect of the repeal of the price restrictions on short sales through an “Impact Study”. In the near term, such a test will involve a comparison of trading in securities which are currently exempt from short sale restrictions with those that remain subject to such restrictions.</td>
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<td>RBC – Supports the repeal of price restrictions but believes other safeguards must be put into place to prevent unrestrained downward pressure on securities.</td>
<td>See response to Canaccord above.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sentry – Allowing unfettered short selling by hedge funds and arbitrageurs would promote “bear raids” against many Canadian long-term savings. Since exchange rules preclude issuer bids being executed on an “uptick”, downticking by short sellers would prevent management from acting in best interests of long-term shareholders during “bear raids”. Expectation that the absence of price restrictions on short</td>
<td>Other rules exist to preclude manipulative behaviour whether it is abusive short selling or “upticking” for the purpose of establishing an artificial price. In the ordinary course, hedge funds or arbitrageurs in executing a short sale have the same objective as a “long-term” investor selling from a long position and that is to maximize proceeds from any sale. Attempts to establish an artificial price, either high or low, is considered manipulative.</td>
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<td>sales will increase volatility and in time of significant market pullbacks it will exacerbate the situation and potentially result in market crashes.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Issuer bids are to be executed at the lowest price available thereby maximizing value for the remaining shareholders. Purchases under an issuer bid can maintain the price but not increase it. The proper parallel to restricting short sales to a price at or above the last sale price would be to restrict purchases by investors on margin to a price at or below the last sale price.</td>
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<td><strong>Swift</strong> — General market manipulation rules are sufficient, and in fact preferable.</td>
<td></td>
<td>See response to Canaccord above.</td>
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<td><strong>Trinidad</strong> – Data should be collected through a “pilot project” on the adequacy of existing system monitors before implementation of tick test changes. IIROC must look at all alternatives (since IIROC has stated that US-style locate rule is not the answer).</td>
<td></td>
<td>Existing alerts detect possible manipulative trading behaviour irrespective of whether the order is from a long, short or undeclared short position. IIROC proposes to add additional alerts which detect significant changes in the pattern of short sales for a particular security. IIROC has questioned the applicability of locate requirements to reduce failed trades as there is no evidence in Canada of a relationship between short sales and failed trades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TSX Group</strong> - Supports the repeal of all price restrictions. System enforced freeze capabilities administered by TSX and TSXV (freezes trading in a security if price movement exceeds predetermined amounts) will assist IIROC in identifying any manipulation.</td>
<td></td>
<td>IIROC acknowledges that the existing “freeze parameters” used by TSX and TSXV (and also CNQ) will also curtail any move to increased volatility that may accompany a repeal of the price restrictions on short sales.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Virgin</strong> – Concerned that unfettered short selling during a period when a company can not announce the extent of “efforts in-progress” will affect the share price and negatively impact the ability of the company to complete a financing. Also concerned on the impact on the grant of options.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rates of short selling vary significantly based on the liquidity of the particular security (e.g. more than 30% of sales of securities on the TSX inter-listed with a US market to only 2% to 4% in general for securities listed on the TSXV or CNQ). See also response to Sentry comment above.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2 Designations and Identifiers

(1) Each order entered on a marketplace shall contain:

... (b) a designation acceptable to the Market Regulator for the marketplace on which the order is entered, if the order is:

<p>| <strong>BMO</strong> and <strong>CSTA</strong> – Supports the elimination of the “short exempt” marker. | | IIROC acknowledges support for the proposal. However, with the decision of IIROC to defer final consideration of that aspect of the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal regarding the repeal of all price restrictions on short sales, provisions related to “short exempt” orders will also be deferred. |</p>
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<td>(i) a Call Market Order, (ii) an Opening Order, (iii) a Market-on-Close Order, (iv) a Special Terms Order, (v) a Volume-Weighted Average Price Order, (v.1) a Basis Order, (v.2) a Closing Price Order, (vi) part of a Program Trade, (vii) part of an intentional cross or internal cross, (viii) a short sale which is subject to the price restriction under subsection (1) of Rule 3.1, (ix) a short sale which is exempt from the price restriction on a short sale in accordance with subsection (2) of Rule 3.1, (x) a non-client order, (xi) a principal order, (xii) a jitney order, (xiii) for the account of a derivatives market maker, (xiv) for the account of a person who is an insider of the issuer of the security which is the subject of the order, (xv) for the account of a person who is a significant shareholder of the issuer of the security which is the subject of the order, or (xvi) of a type for which the Market Regulator may from time to time require a specific or particular designation.</td>
<td>ITG - Supports elimination of the “short exempt” marker but concerned as to how this will affect bundled trades and asks for clarification from IIROC on how bundled trades should be marked and entered. Recommend that bundled trades should continue to be entered as a single trade but marked “short”.</td>
<td>Generally, a sale order from a long position may not be bundled together with a sell order from a short position and entered on a marketplace as a single order. Reference should be made to Market Integrity Notice 2005-025 – Guidance – Bundling Orders from a Long and Short Position (July 27, 2005). Once price restrictions on short sales are removed, one of the principal reasons for wanting to be able to enter a bundled order also will be removed. In the event that a short sale is bundled with a sale from a long position, IIROC has required that the order be marked with the most restrictive applicable markers. IIROC has introduced new procedures to permit the order markings to be corrected in these circumstances. Reference should be made to IIROC Notice 08-0033 - Rules Notice – Guidance Note – UMIR – New Procedures for Order Marker Corrections (July 15, 2008).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS – Supports continuation of marking “short sale” orders. Existing requirement to mark “short exempt” is unnecessary and undue burden.</td>
<td>IIROC acknowledges support for the proposal. See response to comments of BMO and CSTA above.</td>
<td></td>
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**7.10** **Extended Failed Trades**

(1) If within ten trading days following the date for settlement contemplated on the execution of a failed trade, the account:

(a) in the case of a sale, other than a short sale, that failed to make available securities in such number and form; (b) in the case of a short sale, that failed to make:

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<td>BMO – IIROC Statistical Study found that failed trades usually due to administrative error and found no evidence of impact on market integrity. Administrative burden of reporting not warranted. Implementation of NI 24-101 imposes requirement to settle trades within prescribed timeframes. Impact Study could compare fail rates and short sales before and after implementation of NI 24-101. It is not accurate to say that the IIROC Statistical Study found “no evidence of impact on market integrity”. It found that the primary reason for trade failure was administrative error. IIROC acknowledges in the Market Integrity Notice that NI 24-101 imposes a requirement to match trades within prescribed timeframes. The reporting requirement under Rule</td>
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<td>(i) available securities in such number and form, or &lt;br&gt;(ii) arrangements with the Participant or Access Person to borrow securities in such number and form; and &lt;br&gt;(c) in the case of a purchase, that failed to make available monies in such amount, &lt;br&gt;as to permit the settlement of the trade at the time on the date contemplated on the execution of the trade has not made available such securities or monies or has not made arrangements for the borrowing of the securities, as the case may be, the Participant or Access Person that entered the order on a marketplace shall give notice to the Market Regulator at such time and in such form and manner and containing such information as may be required by the Market Regulator.</td>
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<td>strictly to an actual trade. As such UMIR is not the appropriate place to address the issue and the “generic” approach suggested will not address all factors. Suggests that IIROC monitor its concerns for now as NI 24-101 may deal with many of the areas of concern. Reporting proposal will create administrative burden, particularly in cases where there is a reorganization or cross-border issue. Costs for new systems, etc. will be great and will be disproportionately borne by small firms. IIROC should attempt to obtain information from CDS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITG – States that UMIR may not be the appropriate place to address failed trades. There are a number of factors that may cause a fail and these may not relate to the actual trade itself (ie. issues at custodian or prime broker). Reporting fails over 10 days will create an administrative burden where securities are subject of reorganization or tender offer. Reporting will require significant resources and systems. Advisable to first examine impact of NI 24-101.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patch – States that enforcing the 10-day window after settlement is critical. IIROC should monitor which firms are involved in these extended fails, whether patterns emerge and how large fails are closed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBC – Asks: Does the reference to “arrangements ... to borrow” impose US style SHO obligations? Does reporting apply to DAP/cash/margin accounts? Does it apply to client fails/CNS/DP fails? Please clarify the term “resolved” – does the item remain outstanding until the position is fully covered? If IDA members are under SEG, should they be prohibited from short selling? National Instrument 24-101 requires a “confirmation” not a “locate” therefore compliance with 24-101 is not indicative of an ability to</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IIROC</strong> Notice 08-0143 – Rules Notice – Notice of Approval – UMIR - Provisions Respecting Short Sales and Failed Trades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-settle. What happens if 10 day requirement is not met? Why was 10 chosen (not 13 as it is in the U.S.)? Will clients be notified? What if fail occurs because of “tight” market conditions? What is the form and content of the report? Report is onerous.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BMO</strong> – Supports provisions requiring notice for post-trade amendments to price, volume or settlement criteria of a trade. Adjustments for bona fide errors should be exempt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IIROC</strong> Notice 08-0143 – Rules Notice – Notice of Approval – UMIR - Provisions Respecting Short Sales and Failed Trades</td>
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7.112 **Variation and Cancellation of Trades**

No trade executed on a marketplace shall, subsequent to the execution of the trade, be:

(a) cancelled; or

(b) varied with respect to:
### Text of Provisions Following Adoption of the Amendments (Changes from the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal Highlighted)

- (i) the price of the trade,
- (ii) the volume of the trade, or
- (iii) the date for settlement of the trade, except:
  - (c) by the Market Regulator in accordance with UMIR the Rules, or
  - (d) with notice to the Market Regulator immediately following the variation or cancellation of the trade in such form and manner as may be required by the Market Regulator and such notice shall be given, if the variation or cancellation is made:
    - (i) prior to the settlement of the trade, by:
      - (A) the marketplace on which the trade was executed, or
      - (B) the clearing agency through which the trade is or was to be cleared and settled, and
    - (ii) after the settlement of the trade, by each Participant and Access Person that is a party to the trade.

### Commentator and Summary of Comment

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<td><strong>ITG</strong></td>
<td>Agrees that any changes to price and volume should be reported to IIROC. However, notes that this should be done by the marketplace and should not apply to settlement date changes. The Participant should be able to accommodate a client’s request if it can ensure settlement on T+3 with the counterparty. IIROC could monitor these variations by working with CDS.</td>
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### IIROC Response to Comment and Additional IIROC Commentary

- The Amendments essentially require that any variation or cancellation prior to settlement be done through the facilities of a marketplace or clearing agency (and IIROC presently receives notice from these sources). IIROC does not believe an exemption should be made for changes to the settlement date. Special terms orders are not subject to “best price” obligations under UMIR and IIROC needs to be able to verify that the settlement date has not been varied in an attempt to avoid displacement obligations.

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<td><strong>RBC</strong></td>
<td>States that there are numerous reasons for varying or cancelling, therefore the proposal is unworkable. Asks: Is the notice pre/post amendment/cancellation? Approval or notification from IIROC? Can/will IIROC refuse an amendment/cancellation? How does cancellation affect counterparty? Do any other regulators restrict short sales in this manner?</td>
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<td><strong>ITG</strong></td>
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### Additional IIROC Commentary

- **ITG** — Agrees that any changes to price and volume should be reported to IIROC. However, notes that this should be done by the marketplace and should not apply to settlement date changes. The Participant should be able to accommodate a client’s request if it can ensure settlement on T+3 with the counterparty. IIROC could monitor these variations by working with CDS.

### RBC

- States that there are numerous reasons for varying or cancelling, therefore the proposal is unworkable. Asks: Is the notice pre/post amendment/cancellation? Approval or notification from IIROC? Can/will IIROC refuse an amendment/cancellation? How does cancellation affect counterparty? Do any other regulators restrict short sales in this manner?

### BMO

- Does not support cancellation of failed trades due to negative implications it may have to the counter-party.

### Canaccord

- Buy-in and Continuous Net Settlement (CNS) processes in Canada work extremely well. Do not see value in the ability for IIROC to cancel a trade.

### IIROC Response to Comment and Additional IIROC Commentary

- The Amendment is quite clear that the notice is to be given to IIROC “immediately following the variation of cancellation”. Under Rule 10.9, a Market Integrity Official has the power to vary or cancel any trade which is unreasonable or not in compliance with UMIR. See response to ITG comment above.

- IIROC deleted the provision from the Amendments. IIROC will monitor the reports of failed trades that are received pursuant to Rule 7.10 to determine the extent of the problem with “chronic” fails.

As noted in the Market Integrity Notice, the cancellation power would have been used as a last resort essentially when the settlement of the trade would be for the economic benefit of the seller but the seller has not pursued settlement. Before exercising the power, the Market Integrity Official would have to have been satisfied that there was no reasonable prospect that the failure will be rectified in accordance with the requirements of the marketplace or clearing agency.

### Additional IIROC Commentary

- The proposed amendment was intended as a “backstop” when other provisions of the marketplace or clearing agency had not worked and there was no reasonable prospect that such provisions would rectify the continuing failure.
### Text of Provisions Following Adoption of the Amendments (Changes from the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal Highlighted)

#### Commentator and Summary of Comment

- **IIAC** – IIROC cannot cancel a failed trade under the circumstances provided in the proposal. In the interest of the parties and those who rely on report of trades, the requirement should instead be to close out the position within 10 days (the U.S. requirement).
  - See response to BMO and Canaccord comments above.

- **ITG** – Believes that it is not appropriate for IIROC to cancel trades. Current buy-in facilities exist to ensure the buyer ultimately receives the securities. Many intervening events unrelated to settlement could make this problematic to the buyer even if he would benefit from the cancellation.
  - One of the tests that would have had to have been met in cancelling the trade was that the cancellation be in the interest of a fair and orderly market. Cancellation would have been pursued only when in the interest of the non-defaulting party. See response to BMO and Canaccord comments above.

- **Patch** – Queries the benefit of cancelling the trade. This simply gives seller opportunity to eliminate risk that would exist in settling. Cancellation should be a last resort as each trade has an immediate impact on the market.
  - See response to BMO and Canaccord comments above.

- **TD** – Opposes cancellation by IIROC, except in most serious cases of abuse, as not fair to purchasers. Should be dealt with through buy-in rules. IIROC must apply a “reasonableness” test.
  - See response to BMO and Canaccord comments above.

- **AIMA** – CSPR is not meaningful. Decision to continue production of CSPR in any form should be made by market participants who may use it but IIROC must make sure that burdens do not outweigh benefits. Use of trade markers to differentiate between types of shorts may be cumbersome and result in trade information leakage without any material offsetting benefit to the market.
  - While more detailed marking of short sales was one of the options considered by IIROC, IIROC rejected this option as being unduly burdensome to Participants and Access Persons.

#### 10.10 Report of Short Positions

*The Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal recommended the repeal of the requirement to prepare and file semi-monthly a Report on Short Positions. Consideration of this proposal has been deferred until IIROC and the Recognizing Regulators are satisfied that adequate alternative information on short sales executed on a marketplace has become available.*

1. A Participant shall calculate, as of 15th day and as of the last day of each calendar month, the aggregate short position of each individual account in respect of each listed security and quoted security.

2. Unless a Participant maintains the account in which an Access Person has the short position in respect of a listed security or quoted security, the Access Person shall calculate, as of the 15th day and as of the last day of each calendar month, the aggregate short position of the Access Person in respect of each listed security and quoted security.

3. Unless otherwise provided, each Participant and Access Person required

#### IIROC Response to Comment and Additional IIROC Commentary

- **BMO, Canaccord, CNQ, IIAC and ITG** – Supports elimination of CSPR.
  - IIROC acknowledges support for the proposal.

- **BMO** – Does not support replacing CSPR with another report (e.g. report of failed trades or those involving categorizing by markers such as covered, hedged, naked, etc.) that would increase order execution complexity. Is not in favour of any requirement that would eliminate ability to bundle long and short sales.
  - The ability to bundle long and short sales is already restricted. Reference should be made to Market Integrity Notice 2005-025 – Guidance – Bundling Orders from a Long and Short Position (July 27, 2005).
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<td>to file a report in accordance with subsection (1) or (2) shall file a report of the calculation with a Market Regulator in such form as may be required by the Market Regulator not later than two trading days following the date on which the calculation is to be made.</td>
<td><strong>Canaccord</strong> – Distribution of new information will require an effort to educate investors, issuers clearly detailing the change.</td>
<td>IIROC acknowledges that the “replacement” to the CSPR will require an education process. For this reason, IIROC will require that both style of reports be available for a period of time and that the any proposal to repeal of the requirement to prepare and file the CSPR would only be pursued if the replacement information proved to be “adequate”. The Impact Study will look at the relationship between information in the CSPR and any periodic summary reports that may be produced. The findings of the Impact Study on this and other aspects of the Amendments will be published.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CNQ</strong> – Disagree with replacing CSPR with a report that would impose an administrative burden on marketplaces without making the case that the new report would be more meaningful than the old.</td>
<td>The information is readily available to each marketplace and it would also be available through the regulatory feed provided to IIROC by each marketplace. As noted in the Market Integrity Notice, it would be the preference of IIROC for the marketplaces to co-operatively agree on the procedure for the preparation and distribution of the reports.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CPPIB</strong> – States that it does not currently use CSPR, as information therein is inaccurate. If proposed changes do not produce meaningful information, IIROC should consider dropping all requirements. Concerned with suggestion of prohibiting bundling of “long” and “short” sales. Prohibition could reveal trading. Improvement to audit trail that does not serve a market integrity purpose (no market integrity issues found with short sales) should not be pursued at the expense of trading practices.</td>
<td>As noted in the Market Integrity Notice, information on short trading on marketplaces could be produced by a number of sources. See response to BMO comment above.</td>
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<td><strong>CSTA</strong> – Concur that CSPR could be retained to categorize a short position as “covered”, “hedged”, “naked” etc. to give more accurate reading of a company’s “true” short position.</td>
<td>While this information would provide a more accurate view of the “true” short position, IIROC concluded that the administrative burden that would be imposed on Participants and Access Persons would not be worth the benefit.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ITG</strong> - IIROC should work with marketplaces and a data consolidator to provide statistical information about short selling.</td>
<td>See response to CNQ comment above.</td>
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<td><strong>RBC</strong> – Agrees with the change as the accuracy and consistency of current CSPR is questionable. Requires clarification on who would disseminate summary reports going forward ad what role Participants would play. Requires further guidance on what is expected in terms of order marking policies and procedures (for example with regard to dealer sponsored access clients).</td>
<td>See response to CPPIB comment above. The Amendments do not change any of the requirements regarding the marking of short sales. Currently, short sales must be marked whether the order is handled by the Participant or entered by a client with dealer-sponsored access.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TD</strong> – Believes that it is not practical to make marketplaces accountable for reporting short positions. Unbundling trades will increase order handling burden and information leakage. Even if trade were unbundled, it would still be impossible to know aggregate short positions. Current reporting systems should be strengthened by IIROC, rather than introducing new proposals.</td>
<td>The ability to bundle long and short sales is already restricted. Reference should be made to Market Integrity Notice 2005-025 – Guidance – Bundling Orders from a Long and Short Position (July 27, 2005).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Policy 1.1 Definitions**

**Part 3 – Definition of “Short Sale”**

Under the definition of “short sale”, a seller shall be considered to own a security under various circumstances including if the seller, **directly or through an agent or trustee:**

- owns directly or through an agent or trustee another security that is convertible or exchangeable into that security and has tendered such other security for conversion or exchange or has issued irrevocable instructions to convert or exchange such other security;
- has an option to purchase the security and has exercised the option; or
- has a right or warrant to subscribe for the security and has exercised the right or warrant.

In each of these circumstances, the seller must have taken all steps necessary to become legally entitled to the security, including having:

- made any payment required;
- submitted to the appropriate person any required forms or notices; and
- submitted, if applicable, to the appropriate person any certificates, in good delivery form, for securities to be converted, exchanged or exercised.

**BMO** - If price restrictions are not removed, the requirement for payment to be effected before a seller owns the security (long) may be detrimental to efficient market price determination. Tick requirement may result in pricing inefficiencies between derivative and underlying. In the case of options, a requirement that payment must be effected prior to sale may have negative effect on price discovery.

The clarification introduced by the Amendments corresponds to corporate law requirements. The revisions to the provision from the Short Sale and Failed trade Proposal correspond to drafting changes made in the definition of “short sale”.

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**IIROC Notice 08-0143 – Rules Notice – Notice of Approval – UMIR - Provisions Respecting Short Sales and Failed Trades**

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**Policy 1.1 Definitions**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part 4 – Definition of “Short Sale Ineligible Security”</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>IIROC added as a policy under Rule 1.1, the criteria to be taken into account by IIROC when making a designation of a security or class of security as a “short sale ineligible security”. See comments and responses on the definition of a “Short Sale Ineligible Security” above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under the definition of a “short sale ineligible security”, the Market Regulator may designate a security or class of securities in respect of which an order that on execution would be a short sale may not be entered on a marketplace for a particular trading day or trading days. In determining whether to make such a designation, the Market Regulator shall consider whether:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• based on reports of failed trades submitted to the Market Regulator in accordance with Rule 7.10 or other information known to the Market Regulator, there is in a particular security or class of securities an unusual number or pattern of failed trades by more than one Participant or Access Person;</td>
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<td>• the number or pattern of failed trades is related to short selling; and</td>
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<td>• the designation would be in the interest of maintaining a fair and orderly market.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Policy 2.1 – Just and Equitable Principles</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Part 1 – Examples of Unacceptable Activity</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Participants and Access Persons who intentionally organize their business and affairs with the intent or for the purpose of avoiding the application of a Requirement may be considered to have engaged in behaviour that is a failure to conduct business openly and fairly or in accordance with just and equitable principles of trade. For example, the Market Regulator considers that a person who is under an obligation to enter orders on a marketplace who “uses” another person to make a trade off of a marketplace (in circumstances where an “off-market exemption” is not available) to be violating the requirement to conduct business openly and fairly or in accordance with just and equitable principles of trade. Similarly, the Market Regulator considers that a person who enters into a transaction for the purpose of rectifying a failure in connection with a failed trade prior to the time that a report must be filed in accordance with Rule 7.10 and such person knows or ought reasonably to know that such transaction will result in a failed trade to be engaging in “re-aging” for the purpose of avoiding reporting obligations contrary to the requirement to conduct business openly and fairly or in accordance with just and equitable principles of trade.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**Policy 3.1 Restrictions on Short Selling**

**Part 1 – Entry of Short Sales Prior to the Opening**

Prior to the opening of a marketplace on a trading day, a short sale may not be entered on that marketplace as a market order and must be entered as a limit order and have a limit price at or above the last sale price of that security as indicated in a consolidated market display (or at or above the previous day’s close reduced by the amount of a dividend or distribution if the security will commence ex-trading on the opening).

**Policy 3.1 Restrictions on Short Selling**

**Part 2 – Short Sale Price When Trading Ex-Distribution**

When reducing the price of a previous trade by the amount of a distribution, it is possible that the price of the security will be between the trading increments. (For example, a stock at $10 with a dividend of $0.125 would have an ex-dividend price of $9.875. A short sale order could only be entered at $9.87 or $9.88.) Where such a situation occurs, the price of the short sale order should be set no lower than the next highest price. (In the example, the minimum price for the short sale would be $9.88, being the next highest price at which an order may be entered to the ex-dividend price of $9.875).

In the case of a distribution of securities (other than a stock split) the value of the distribution is not determined until the security that is distributed has traded. (For example, if shareholders of ABC Co. receive shares of XYZ Co. in a distribution, an initial short sale of ABC on an ex-distribution basis may not be made at a price below the previous trade until XYZ Co. has traded and a value determined).

Once a security has traded on an ex-distribution basis, the regular short sale rule applies and the relevant price is the previous trade.

**Specific Matters on Which Comments Were Requested**

1. Should IIROC consider a “pilot project” to evaluate the effect of the repeal of price restrictions on the short sale of illiquid securities rather than the outright repeal of all price restrictions?

**Commentator and Summary of Comment**

**Acuity** – Opposed to the outright repeal of price restrictions. Recommends a “pilot project” be completed to evaluate the effect of repeal on all Canadian securities. Study would be able to determine a size threshold below which the repeal of price restrictions may have a detrimental impact on volatility.

**AIMA** – A “pilot project” is not necessary or beneficial. A body of knowledge to support the proposed amendments

**IIROC Response to Comment and Additional IIROC Commentary**

With the decision to defer consideration of the repeal of price restrictions on short sale, Part 1 of Policy 3.1 has not been repealed as proposed in the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal.

With the decision to defer consideration of the repeal of price restrictions on short sale, Part 2 of Policy 3.1 has not been repealed as proposed in the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal.
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<td>already exists. Proposed “Impact Study” is sufficient to see if further amendments are required to mitigate any potential increase in volatility.</td>
<td>recommended by IIROC for a repeal of price restrictions accompanied by the conduct of the Impact Study. That aspect of the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal dealing with the repeal of price restrictions on all short sales has been deferred and this proposal is not included in the Amendments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canaccord</strong> – Little value in “pilot project” for TSXV securities where IIROC is already monitoring for market manipulation. IIROC should continue to monitor illiquid stocks across TSX and TSXV for short sales that might create manipulative volatility.</td>
<td>See response to AIMA comment above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CCLIM</strong> – Smaller cap stocks should experience a larger increase in volatility – measured as a range in price over a specified period divided by the price of the security. This is a result of an increase in proactive trading and the volatility calculation method and is not a result of a deterioration of market quality. Relative spreads (quoted bid-ask spread divided by price) increase for smaller stocks. Short sellers may hit bids (“cross the spread”) more often without a tick test thereby increasing volatility but this is a natural result of an increase in trading.</td>
<td>See response to AIMA comment above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CPPB</strong> – Answers: No. Improvements to market efficiency too compelling to delay full implementation of changes. UMIR prohibition against manipulation gives IIROC the tools to address abuses.</td>
<td>See response to AIMA comment above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CSTA</strong> – “Pilot project” should identify non-inter-listed highly-liquid stocks and illiquid stocks, similar to the SEC trials. Inter-listed securities should remain exempt from the trial period in order to remain competitive.</td>
<td>See response to AIMA comment above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IASBDA</strong> – A “pilot program” is not useful because it may not be relevant to a period of significant volatility. The U.S. pilot failed to adequately foretell what would happen in a volatile market. Instead, would suggest slowly phase in the elimination of the tick test starting with most liquid. This should occur only after solidifying disclosure of fails requirement (i.e. be cautious when removing one short sale limitation and imposing another).</td>
<td>See response to AIMA comment above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Text of Provisions Following Adoption of the Amendments (Changes from the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal Highlighted)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ITG</strong> – Does not support a “pilot project”. US reviews did not show materially negative impact on illiquid securities. Marketplaces must make necessary changes within timelines suggested by IIROC to ensure that industry can benefit from changes and do not have to incur costs to develop temporary fixes.</td>
<td>See response to AIMA comment above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MS</strong> – “Pilot project” not necessary to evaluate effectiveness of repeal of price restrictions as continuation of monitoring for two regimes (Canadian and U.S.) is burdensome to dealers. Concur with Impact Study proposal.</td>
<td>See response to AIMA comment above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RBC</strong> – Yes. The SHO Pilot Project did not adequately reflect the Canadian marketplace. The IIROC Statistical Study may not have provided an accurate correlation between short selling and failed trades. Details of “pilot project” and interim results should be made public. Should be designed/conducted by a third-party statistician.</td>
<td>In part, the SHO Pilot Project did not adequately reflect the Canadian marketplace because securities traded on the Nasdaq Small Cap Market, the Bulletin Board and the Pink Sheets have not been subject to price restrictions on short sales. See response to Acuity comment above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Swift</strong> – No need for a pilot project and its associated costs and administrative burdens.</td>
<td>See response to AIMA comment above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TD</strong> – Believes that there is no need for the “pilot project”.</td>
<td>See response to AIMA comment above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trinidad</strong> – States that data should be through a “pilot project” collected on adequacy of existing system monitors before implementation of tick test changes. Suggests that the difficulties including TSXV securities in a “pilot project” are not sufficient reason not to conduct the project. TSXV securities are much less liquid.</td>
<td>See response to RBC comment above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TSX Group</strong> – Strongly disagrees with “pilot project” proposal. Subjecting a control group of illiquid securities will cause confusion, be administratively burdensome and may encourage dealers to stop trading the control group securities. Instead, strongly supports the idea of the “Impact Study”.</td>
<td>See response to AIMA comment above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Virgin</strong> – Given the possible increased volatility for small venture firms, suggests that US experience should be monitored for a 2-5 year period. Delay would allow time to</td>
<td>The Impact Study will be conducted for a period of at least 12 months. While the repeal of price restrictions on all short sales was deferred and not included in the</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provision</td>
<td>Commentator and Summary of Comment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amendments, the exemption from price restrictions for various securities including the Inter-listed Exemption will continue in place. IIROC has indicated that price restrictions could be re-instituted even before the completion of the Impact Study if abuses or changes in trading patterns warranted the re-introduction. Price restrictions on short sales did not apply to OTC or Pink Sheet companies in the US (or the NASDAQ Small Cap Market) and as such the US rule change to repeal restrictions should have no impact.</td>
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2. **If IIROC were to undertake a pilot project, what should be the duration of the pilot project?**

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Acuity</strong></td>
<td>Not less than four quarters, to account for seasonality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CSTA</strong></td>
<td>Six months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MS</strong></td>
<td>Does not agree with “pilot project” but, if undertaken, should be no longer than one year and should attempt to minimize time, expense and systems impact for dealers.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>RBC</strong></td>
<td>Should be recommended by a third-party statistician.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TD</strong></td>
<td>One year.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

   | **CSTA** | Six months. |
   | **MS** | Does not agree with “pilot project” but, if undertaken, should be no longer than one year and should attempt to minimize time, expense and systems impact for dealers. |
   | **RBC** | Should be recommended by a third-party statistician. |
   | **TD** | One year. |

3. **How should a pilot project be implemented for TSXV-listed securities if the TSXV does not support the “short exempt” marker?**

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<tr>
<td><strong>CSTA</strong></td>
<td>TSXV should support “short exempt” marker to ensure complete evaluation of repeal of price restrictions in “pilot project”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MS</strong></td>
<td>Does not agree with “pilot project” but, if undertaken, market centres should bear the responsibility for supporting “short sale” indicators without mandating use of the “short exempt” marker.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RBC</strong></td>
<td>Project should deal with only core TSX securities.</td>
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   | **CSTA** | TSXV should support “short exempt” marker to ensure complete evaluation of repeal of price restrictions in “pilot project”. |
   | **MS** | Does not agree with “pilot project” but, if undertaken, market centres should bear the responsibility for supporting “short sale” indicators without mandating use of the “short exempt” marker. |
   | **RBC** | Project should deal with only core TSX securities. |

   The timing for the implementation of a “short exempt” market on the TSXV could significantly defer the commencement of any pilot project (perhaps to the first quarter of 2009 or later).
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<td>of a security that trades on the TSX as compared to TSXV. Reference should be made to the table on page 16 of the Market Integrity Notice. UMIR is intended to apply across marketplaces and therefore there should be policy reasons to justify different treatment. While IIROC would expect greater volatility on junior markets as a result of the elimination of price restrictions on short sales, there is currently no evidence that this would result in increased risks to market integrity.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TD</strong> – TSX and TSXV trading engines should be reprogrammed to reflect the rule change.</td>
<td>See response to CSTA comment above.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. What costs or administrative burdens would marketplaces, Participants and Access Persons incur in connection with a pilot project?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Acuity</strong> – Costs should be borne by those market participants who are interested in having the proposed price restriction repeal adopted.</td>
<td>IIROC notes the comment that any costs associated with a pilot project should be borne by Participants and Access Persons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MS</strong> – Dealers would have an obligation to (i) implement systems changes to satisfy temporary rules, followed by additional changes subsequent to amendments and (ii) maintain two sets of protocols for pilot and non-pilot securities.</td>
<td>IIROC acknowledges that one problem with a “pilot project” is the need for Participants to deal distinctly with securities that are included in the pilot as compared to those that are excluded. If Participants handle all securities as if restrictions continued to apply (in order not to breach any rule) the resulting information from the pilot project would be “compromised”.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>RBC</strong> – A prolonged implementation period leading to an uneven Canada/U.S. playing field would be a potential administrative burden.</td>
<td>The timing for the implementation of a “short exempt” market on the TSXV could significantly defer the commencement of any pilot project (perhaps to the first quarter of 2009 or later). If the pilot project lasted for a period of one year, the subsequent time period for preparation of the report and adoption of rule changes would realistically mean difference in the regimes in Canada and the United States until late 2010 or early 2011.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>5. Would there be any specific costs or benefits associated with UMIR adopting provisions comparable to those in the United States related to short sales (such as a mandatory locate requirement, and documentation requirements for sales from a long position) and/or failed trades (such as the maintenance of a fails list and close-out requirements for securities on the</strong></td>
<td><strong>Acuity</strong> – Broker-dealers should be required under UMIR to borrow, enter into an agreement to borrow or have reasonable grounds to believe they can borrow, a security before effecting a short sale in that security. This will ensure potentially abusive “naked” short selling does not occur.</td>
<td>Rule 2.2 of UMIR presently requires that there be a “reasonable expectation” of settling any trade at the time of the entry of the order.</td>
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<td>This will also avoid an imbalance in buying and selling; the volume of a security available for short selling should not be limitless.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AIMA</strong> – Costs of harmonizing with the U.S. not necessary or beneficial. Existing policies and policies in proposed amendments sufficient to safeguard against fails resulting from shorts.</td>
<td>IIROC notes the consensus of the commentators is opposition to a “fails list”, “locate” requirement and “close-out requirement” comparable to those in the United States.</td>
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<td><strong>Canaccord</strong> – Canadian regulators should not follow the provisions made in the U.S.</td>
<td>See response to AIMA comment above.</td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>IASBDA</strong> – UMIR should not include “locate” requirement as it has proven ineffective and difficult to enforce.</td>
<td>See response to AIMA comment above.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IIAC</strong> – Whilst supportive of removal of tick test, does not wish to move to U.S. style pre-borrow system. Naked shorting has not been shown to be a problem in Canada. Requirement to pre-borrow would result in smaller firms being placed at a financial disadvantage, as stock borrowing is controlled in Canada by the larger industry participants.</td>
<td>See response to AIMA comment above.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MS</strong> – Locate and documentation requirements would impose unnecessary burdens and costs not warranted by generally low rates of failures in Canada. If U.S.-style regime is adopted, it must be consistent with the U.S. regime.</td>
<td>See response to AIMA comment above.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RBC</strong> – Asks: Have the long term implications of misalignment between the proposed regime and the US regime been assessed?</td>
<td>The US regime would impose significant administrative and compliance burdens on Canadian market participants without significant benefits as trade failure rates are significantly lower in Canada than in the US.</td>
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<td><strong>Swift</strong> – No need for US-style “locate” in Canada given available evidence on failed trades.</td>
<td>See response to AIMA comment above.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TD</strong> – Believes that dealer costs for technology and processes would not be substantial. These costs would be more than offset by benefits of aligning with US rules.</td>
<td>See response to AIMA comment above.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trinidad</strong> – Suggests that IIROC should run a US-style fail list. IIROC will have the necessary data. Cost of electronic dissemination would be minimal. Canadian dealers who</td>
<td>Canadian dealers that forward orders to the United States, forward such orders to dealers registered in the United States for intermediation. The US-registered dealer will have the responsibility for compliance with</td>
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<td>short sell in the US will already have systems in place.</td>
<td>requirements applicable in the United States.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>General Comments</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AIMA</strong> – Very supportive of proposed amendments. Market volatility is not analogous to market integrity. UMIR provisions on manipulative and deceptive trading are sufficient to deal with abuses.</td>
<td>IIROC notes the support for the proposal.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BMO</strong> – Existing mechanisms available to regulators are adequate to ensure manipulative and deceptive practices are detected and contained. As such, do not support any alternatives to repeal of price restrictions set out in the MIN as they add unnecessary complexity (i.e. exemption from price restrictions only for highly liquid).</td>
<td>IIROC notes the opposition to available alternatives to the repeal of price restrictions.</td>
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<td><strong>CPPIB</strong> – States that IIROC should consider changing sanction guidelines for short sale markers to reflect that infractions will have an administrative (not market integrity) impact.</td>
<td></td>
<td>While the audit trail should be accurate, IIROC acknowledges that errors will be made in order marking but the concern of IIROC is in circumstances when errors in order marking are accompanied by manipulative or other violative behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CSTA</strong> – In light of elimination of price restrictions, regulatory bodies must continue efforts to detect manipulative and deceptive activity and respond with enforcement.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The existing tools available to IIROC detect patterns of trading activity that are indicative of an “artificial price” either high or low or other forms of manipulative behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coates</strong> – Objects to ability of dealers to use clients’ shares to be used for short selling. Wishes to be able to disallow dealer from doing so. Understands that these would also not be allowed to be used for margin. Feels that if client owns shares, then client should determine their use during the term of ownership.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Securities which are segregated by a dealer are not available for securities lending. Securities which have been pledged as security for loans by the dealer to the client are available for lending by the dealer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patch</strong> – States that naked short selling is wrong. US criminals bring business to Canada to circumvent US laws simply because of the Canadian opportunity to sell short. In IIROC’s study on Failed Trades, did IIROC investigate the market trading around failed trades and whether dealers utilized manipulative leverage? IIROC should be cautious.</td>
<td></td>
<td>At the end of the day, all short positions need to be covered. Short selling accounts for approximately 25% of trading activity on marketplaces thereby providing liquidity. As noted in the Market Integrity Notice, entering a short sale without the reasonable expectation of settlement is presently considered</td>
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<td>when applying results of US studies (such as those conducted by the SEC OEA) to the Canadian market. The SEC manipulated the results to present a fictitious picture to the US investing public.</td>
<td><strong>RBC</strong> – Believes that, by increasing efficiency of transfer agents, marked improvement would be seen in failed trades. Request a solution on the re-registration of securities (ie. 144A). How will proposal affect responsibilities of market makers on TSXV and Pure? Who is responsible for determining ownership of options/rights/warrants – if the “seller” then what responsibilities do dealers have regarding this determination?</td>
<td>IIROC has issued guidance to assist in the same of securities subject to US transfer restrictions. In particular, see Market Integrity Notice 2006-006 – Guidance – Sales of Securities Subject to Certain United States Securities Laws (February 17, 2006). The Amendments revised the Proposed Amendments by including certain additional provisions exempting market makers (including derivatives market makers) from the restrictions on the marking of short sales and from prohibitions on trading a “Short Sale Ineligible Security”. See Rule 3.1 above. Under securities legislation, the “seller” has an obligation to declare to a dealer that an order is “short”. In keeping with the trading supervision obligations of a Participant, a Participant has an obligation to inquire of an account holder if a sale is short if the securities are not otherwise held by the account holder at the Participant. The Participant must assure itself that there is a “reasonable expectation” that any trade that would result from the execution of the order will be able to settle.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Swift</strong> – Price downturns are accentuated in those markets with the tightest short sale restrictions (e.g. certain Asian market which prohibit short sales). Removal of price restrictions allow markets to accurately price securities without “positive bias” and improves liquidity and arbitrage opportunities.</td>
<td>IIROC notes the comment respecting volatility effects when short selling activity is prohibited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td><strong>Trinidad</strong> – States that naked short selling places artificial downward pressure on the price of the security by causing the number of outstanding securities to be larger than is actually the case. It is a fraud against investors, issuers and the market. Enforcement must be discussed in the next release, particularly the role the members of the CSA/SRO</td>
<td>See the response to Patch comment above. The existing tools available to IIROC detect patterns of trading activity that are indicative of an “artificial price” either high or low or other forms of manipulative behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Text of Provisions Following Adoption of the Amendments (Changes from the Short Sale and Failed Trade Proposal Highlighted)</td>
<td>Commentator and Summary of Comment</td>
<td>IIROC Response to Comment and Additional IIROC Commentary</td>
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<td>working group will play in enforcement against naked shorting. In the next release, IIROC should provide support for assertion that existing system can deal with abusive short sale practices.</td>
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